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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

MERWYN L. WILKINSON,
Plaintiff,
vs.

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF UTAH; GARRETT FREIGHTLINES, INC. and TRUCK INSURANCE EXCHANGE,

Case
No. 11814

Defendants.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is a proceeding to review a decision by
the Industrial Commission of Utah denying plaintiff's
claim to workmen's compensation benefits.
DISPOSITION BELOW
On or about December 12, 1967, plaintiff filed
an application for hearing to settle an industrial
accident claim.

A

hearing was nela on April

1

1969,

before Robert J. Shaughnessey, Hearing Examiner for
the Industrial Commission.

On May 22, 1969, plain-

tiff's claim to compensation was denied in its entirety by the Industrial Commission.

Thereafter, on

June 4, 1969, plaintiff filed with said Commission a
Motion for Extension of Time to file a Motion for Review of the Commission's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, and the Commission granted a
30 days' extension of time from June 9, 1969, in which
to file Petitioner's Motion for Review.

On June 26,

1969, plaintiff filed his Motion for Review of the
Commission's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Order, and said Motion for Review was denied by the
Commission on August 1, 1969.
RELIEF SOUGHT IN THIS PROCEEDING
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the Commission's
decision below.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff was employed as a truck driver at
Garrett Freightlines, Inc.

2

He was severely injured

in an automobile accident which occurred on September
7, 1967, at about 4:15 p.m. at 50 South Redwood Road
in Salt Lake City, Utah, directly in front of the
place of business of plaintiff's employer.

Plaintiff

was attempting to egress from his employer's placr of
business by making a left turn on to Redwood Road.
The collision occurred on the inside south-bound lane
of Redwood Road.
Plaintiff was a driver on the "extra board" at
Garrett Freightlines.

The "extra board" drivers are

drivers that have no definite driving times or regular assignments, but who are called to take extra
runs when the need arises.

When an "extra board"

driver completes a driving assignment, he signs his
name at the bottom of the extra board list and is
called when all the other drivers above him in their
turn have been called to drive.

The record is quite

clear that although most of the extra drivers receive
their assignments in the early evening hours and are
on call thereafter, the extra board drivers are also
subject to call between the hours of 7:00 a.m. and
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4:00 p.m.

If a driver is not available when his call

comes, his name is dropped to the bottom of the list
and he then is required to wait one complete rotation
until his name appears again.

The record indicates

as follows:

Q.

Item number 7 on Defendant's
exhibit No. 3 states the following:
"Drivers who have not been alerted for
dispatch shall remain in their position
on the board, and subject to call for
dispatch at 7:00 a.m. Drivers not
available between the hours of 7:00 a.m.
and 4:00 p.m. shall be dropped to the
bottom of the board." Does this mean,
Mr. Stoddard, that although the normal
course of events, as far as the drivers
to go out in the evening, that there
are some men that go out during the day?
A.

Yes, Sir.

Q.

And have to be on call?

A.

Yes, Sir.

Record at 46.
Plaintiff's sole purpose in being at his emplayer's place of business before the accident was
to let his employer know that he was available to
go to work and to ascertain his probable departure
time that evening.
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Plaintiff testified that he remembers calling
in to Garrett Freightlines sometime on the day of the

accident, September 7, 1967.

He was told that he

would likely drive a truck sometime that evening for
his employer.

He testified that since he would not

be home to receive their call, he would check in
with Garrett later on in the afternoon, no later than
5:30 p.m.

Record at 56-57.

Mr. Christensen, the

terminal manager, made a notation on the extra board
sheet to the effect that plaintiff would call in at
17:30 hours.

In accordance with plaintiff's inten-

tions, he did report before 5:30 p.m. and talked to
the dispatcher personally at or around 4:00 p.m. on
the afternoon of September 7, 1967:

Q. Now, if you can reflect back
on the day of September 7, 1967, can you
recall having called Garrett Freightlines
sometime during the day to ascertain your
relative position on the board, or your
probable departure time?
A.

Yes, I can remember.

Q.

What can you remember about that?

I ca11
t!.Lc.1
they'd be going out that evening
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that

I--and I was [not] going to be home
so I told them that I would check
back later in the afternoon.

Q. Did you make any arrangements--first of all, can you remember whether you made any arrangements
to report to Garrett Freightlines?
A. Well, I can't remember any.
I knew it would be before 5:30 because
that was usually the time they would
call you, but I can't remember, no.

Q. Can you remember with whom
you spoke earlier in the day by telephone?
A. No, I can't remember exactly
who it was.

Q. You mentioned that there was
an understanding that you report there
in person later in the afternoon.
A. Well, I told them I wasn't
home and I would probably stop in in
the afternoon, yes.

Q. Do you recollect whether anyone there expressed any disapproval with
your intention to report personally?
A. No. Nobody gave me any disapproval. No, sir.

Q. At what time did you actually
report at Garrett's? Can you remember
the time?
A. I can remember it was around
4:00 or after. That's about it. It

6

would be shortly after.

Q. And, what was your reason for
coming in at that particular time?
A. Well, I just told him I'd be
there before 5:30 and I just figured it
was close enough that they would have a
pretty good idea what I'd be doing that
night. I can't remember how far down
the board I was. But, of course, like I
say, I learned that it would be eaten up
pretty fast sometimes, and I knew that
it was important that I keep in touch.

Q. Were you in the vicinity at
the time and feeling you'd just drop in?
A. Well, it depends on what you'd
call "vicinity." I was down there on 13th
South and Second West and I believe down
in there. I just figured it would be a
good time to, that I should either call or,
you know, either go back there.

Q.

Was it your feeling that they
anticipated your reporting sometime around
the time that you came in?
A. Yes. Well, yes. I knew that
they'd be calling me if I didn't let them
know where I was.

Q. Mr. Wilkinson, what was the sole
purpose of your being at Garrett's between
4:00 and 4:30 on September 7, 1967?
A. My sole purpose was to let them
know that I was available to go to work and
to find out exactly how much time I had, free
time, before I had to go to work.
Record at 56-57, 60, 63-64.
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ARGUMENT
1.

THE UTAH WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION STATUTE
SHOULD BE LIBERALLY CONSTRUED.
Section 35-1-45, Utah Code Annotated

(Repl. vol. 1966), states:
Every employee . • • who is injured
. . • by accident arising out of or
in the course of his employment, wheresoever such injury occurred,
provided the same was not purposely
self-inflicted, shall be entitled
to receive, and shall be paid, such
compensation for loss sustained on
account of such injury or death, and
such amount for medical, nurse and
hospital services and medicines, and,
in case of death, such amount of
funeral expenses, as is herein provided. (Emphasis added.)
The terms "arising out of" and ''in the course
of" are not synonymous.

"IT]he words 'arising out

of' are construed to refer to the origin or cause of
the injury, and the words 'in the course of' refer
to the time, place, and circumstances under which
it occurred."

Utah Apex Mining Company v. Indus-

trial Comm'n, 67 Utah 537, 545, 248 P. 490, 493 (1926).

will exist; nevertheless, "many accidents may occur
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in the course of employment which do not arise

out of it."

Id.

Thus, an injury will not "arise

out of employment" unless the employee was injured
when doing the specific job for which he was hired·
'
but the same injury could be "in the course of
employment" if, for instance, the employee was
attempting to leave the premises of his employer
after his duties of employment had ended.
at 551, 248 P. at 495.

See id.

See also Vitagraph, Inc. v.

Industrial Comm'n, 96 Utah 190, 194, 85 P.2d 601,
607 (1938).

Unlike most jurisdictions, the Utah statute
allows compensation "when the accident arises in
the course of employment, whether it arises out of
employment or not."

Id. at 545, 248 P. at 492.

Utah Supreme Court has stated:
[T]he Legislature amended that feature
of the Act by substituting the word "or"
for the word "and" thereby providing for
compensation whenever either condition
was established. No doubt after two
years' experience in operating the Act
the Legislature arrived at the conclusion that
to employes and their
dependents demanded a more liberal provision than was afforded by the statute
in 1917. In any event, the Legislature

9

The

recognized that there was a substantial difference between the terms
" arising
..
ou t o f" an d""in the course of"
and amended the statute accordingly.
It is the duty of the court to give
due effect to the evident purpose of
the amendment.
id. at 550-51, 248

P,

at 494-95.

The statute was

also amended in 1919 by adding the words "wheresoever
such injury occurred."

495.

See

g.

at 553, 248 p. at

Accordingly, the Utah Supreme Court has con-

tinually construed the Work.men's Compensation Act
liberally to protect a claimant upon any legitimate
claim.

Vause v. Industrial Comm'n, 17 Utah 2d

217, 407 P.2d 1006 (1965); Chandler v. Industrial
Conun'n, 55 Utah 213, 184 P. 1020 (1919).
II.

PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED BY AN ACCIDENT THAT
OCCURRED IN THE COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT

A.

In Utah, Injuries Occurring at the
Entrance of Employer's Premises are
Compensable.
Plaintiff contends that it was contemplated

as a part of his employment that he report to make
himself available for his employer's call.
accepted practice to report
by telephone.

It was

personally or

His actions in thus reporting were

beneficial to his employer.
10

By reason of his

employment and the

rL·.:·.·,1 : 1, ....
,
•
< . ·- •• L

for call, plaintiff \..

t

0

D

available

to the hazardous

1.;

and dangerous highi.;.iy

it ion:; surrounding the

entrance to his

:• i'l

degree greater than ti1t·

of business to a
public.

The

hazards peculiar to this L'ntr;rnce thus became the
hazards of plaintiff's

and there exists

a direct causal rebtionship bct\,·een the accident
and the employment.

Consequently, the injury

occasioned when plainti[f was attempting to egress
from his employer's place of business was a.n injury
"arising out of or in the course of employment"
within the meaning of the Utah Workmen's Compensation Act, Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-45
(Repl. vol. 1966), and plaintiff is entitled to
compensation under that Act.
In Utah it appears definitely settled that
if an employee is injured in the normal course of
things, in going to or from his work or place of
employment, his iniurv is the result of normal
hazards that everyone encounters and is therefore
not in the course of employment.
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Vitagraph, Inc.

v. Industrial Comm'n, 96 Utah 190, 194, 85 P.2d
601, 607 (1938); Denver & R.G.W.R.R. v. Industrial
Comm'n,
--·

72 Utah 199, 269 P. 512 (1928).

Never-

theless, there is at least one exception to this
rule, recognized by the Utah courts, which allows

recovery for injuries received away from the employer's plant or the employee's work sites.
It is well settled in Utah that if an employee, by reason of his employment, is exposed to a
peril at the entranceway to his employer's premises
which is common to all, but by virtue of his employment is peculiarly and abnormally exposed to this
common peril, the exposure becomes an incident to
the employment and sustains the causal relationship
between employment and the accident.

In Cudahy

Packing Company v. Industrial Comm'n, 60 Utah 161,
207 P. 148 (1922), aff'd, Cudahy Packing Company
v. Parramore, 263 U.S. 418, 44 S.Ct. 153 (1923),

an employee was killed when the car in which he
was riding was struck by a train at a crossing on
a county road leading to his employer's plant.

The

road was the only means of access to the plant, and
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it was necessary for the employees going to work

to pass over these railroad tracks on the public
road where the accident happened.

At the time the

accident occurred, the deceased was not on the premises of the plaintiff, and was not engaged in any
actual work connected with his employment.

The

train which collided with the deceased's automobile
was in no way under control of the employer, nor was
it

engaged in any work for or in behalf of the em-

ployer.
i.1ay

The employer did not control nor in any

attempt to control the method or manner of travel

to or from work by its employees.

The court held

that the dependents of the deceased could recover
under the Utah Workmen's Compensation Act because the
danger incident to crossing the railroad track, by
reason of its location and proximity to the employer's plant, must have been within the contemplation
of the parties at the date of employment and that
the accident would, therefore, arise both out of
and occur in the course of employment.
noted

The court

iSi9 amendment to the Act which substi-

tuted the word "or" for the word "and" in the phrase
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''arising out of or in the course of employment"
and upheld the phrase "wheresoever such injury has
occurred" against any constitutional attack.
The United States Supreme Court in affirming
the Utah decision stated:
[I]t is enough if there be a
causal connection between the injury
and the business in which [the employer] employs the [claimant]--a
connection substantially contributory
though it need not be the sole proximate cause.
The fact that the accident happens upon a public road or at a railroad crossing and that the danger is
one to which the general public is
likewise exposed, is not conclusive
against the existence of such causal
relationship, if the danger be one to
which the employee, by reason of and
in connection with his employment, is
subjected peculiarly or to an abnormal
degree.
263 U.S. at 423-24, 44 S.Ct. at 154.

The decision

of the Utah court was also attacked because the
accident occurred a few minutes before work was to
begin.

The Court indicated that "the employment

contemplated [the employee's] entry upon and departure from the premises as much as it contemplated
his working there, and must include a reasonable

14

'nterval of time for that purpose."

l

263 u . s . at

426, 44 S.Ct. at 155.
In the subsequent case of Bountiful Brick Comv. Industrial Comm'n, 68 Utah 600, 251 P. 555
(1926), aff'd, Bountiful Brick Company v. Giles,
276 U.S. 154, 48 S.Ct. 221 (1928), the Cudahy case,
supra, was relied on in granting recovery under the
Workmen's Compensation Act to the dependents of a
deceased who was struck and killed by a train while
he was crossing a railroad track adjacent to the
place of the employer's business.

The court allowed

recovery although there was a safer route to the
plant approximately one-half mile greater in distance.
The court held that a reasonable person would not
expect the employee to have used the longer route
and that the shorter route was a fair and necessary
means for proceeding to or coming from his work.
The court stated:
The employee, in crossing the
track at any time, was exposed to a
peril which is common to all, but by
virtue ot his employment ne was required to cross the track regularly
and continuously, thus being peculiarly
and abnormally exposed to a common peril.
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It is the greater degree of exposure
to the peril which arises as an incident to the employment which sustains
the causal relation between the employment and the accident.
68 Utah at 604, 251 P. at 556.
The rule in the Cudahy case, supra, has been
extended to include compensation for injuries received on a public highway when the peculiar risks
of a railroad crossing were not present.

In Park

Utah Consolidated Mines Company v. Industrial
Comm'n, 103 Utah 64, 133 P.2d 314 (1943), the injured employee was leaving work on foot when he
slipped and broke his ankle on a public highway approximately four feet removed from the premises of
the employer.

The court stated:

We believe the decision of this
case must be controlled by the case of
Cudahy Packing Company v. Industrial
Comm'n, supra. We do not think the
principle upon which the case was ruled
justifies limiting the hazard to a railroad crossing or a right-of-way adjacent to the premises of the employer.
The facts of this case come within the
exception to the rule that there can be
no Workmen's Compensation for an accident
going to or iLuill wock.
The general rule is precicated upon the
fact that the employee selects the particular way, means, and conveyance for
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going to and from work. When the
employee arrives at the threshhold
of his employment and the means for
entrance are limited so that he has
no choice as to the mode of entrance
all of the hazards which are peculiar'
to such entrance attach to his employment. The converse is equally
true as to leaving the employment.
103 Utah at 71, 133 P.2d at 317 (emphasis added).
Also, the court reiterated the fact that Utah has a
more liberal rule regarding employment compensation
than most states and that the results reached in
decisions of other states are distinguishable.
Consequently, the foregoing cases establish
the principle that an employee may recover for injuries sustained at the entrance to the employer's premises when the use of such entrance is contemplated
from the employee's employment and when the use of
the entrance constitutes a hazard to which the employee by reason of his employmeuL is subjected to
a degree greater than the general public.

It ap-

pears to be immaterial that the deceased was not
on the premises of the employer at the time of
the

was not engaged in any actual work

connected with his employment, and was in no way
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injured through an instrumentality under the control
of the employer.

B.

Utah's Case Law is in Harmony with
Other Jurisdictions.
Authorities in other jurisdictions likewise
In 1

support the plaintiff's recovery in this case.

Larsen, Workmen's Compensation, Section 15.13, at

199-202 (1966), it is stated:
The commonest ground of extension
[extension of the rule limiting recovery
for travel to and from work to the actual
premises of the employer] is that the
off-premises point at which the injury
occurred lies on the only route, or at
least on the normal route, which employees
must traverse to reach the plant, and
that therefore the special hazards of that
route become the hazards of the employment. This general idea seems to have been
accepted by the majority of jurisdictions
in some degree.
According to Larsen, the underlying theory for the
above exception is not respondeat superior, since in
these cases there is no control over the employee
by the employer, no wages are usually being paid at
the time of the accident, and the interests of the
ernp:i.uyer art::!

uu L

usually being auvd.11\...t!U.

··-...
.LL

.Lb

simply that, when a court has satisfied itself that
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there is a causal connection between the conditions
under wl1ich claimant must approach and leave the
premises and the occurrence of the injury, it may
hold that the course of employment extends as far as
those conditions extend."

Id. at 211.

The majority

ruled thus recited by Larsen exists even though the
majority of jurisdictions have a statute dissimilar
with Utah's inasmuch as most jurisdictions require
that the injury arise out of and be in the course
of the employment.
For instance, in Greydanus v. Industrial Accident Commission, 47 Cal. Rpt. 384, 407 P.2d 296
(1965), the California Supreme Court under such a
statute upheld an employee's claim for injuries
sustained when he was making a left-hand turn into
his employer's premises from a public highway.

The

court affirmed the Commission's finding that the applicant had entered the necessary means of access
to the employer's premises and, thus, had come with-

in the field of special risk created by the employment.

The court cited with

19

Indemnity

v. Industrial Accident Commission, 28 Cal.2d
329, 170 P.2d 18 (1946).

In that case the claimant

was making a left turn into the place of business
of his employer and was hit by another car.

The

front wheels came to rest on the parking lot of
the employer.

The court held that the accident arose

out of and in the course of employment and that it
was immaterial that the accident occurred some threeand-a-half blocks from the claimant's actual place
of employment on the employer's plant, that the accident occurred some minutes before work was to begin, and that the accident occurred on a public highway.

Nor was the fact that the entrance was not the

only one detrimental to the claimant's cause.

The

court stated:
In compensation law the general
rule is well established that injuries
received by an employee while going to
or coming from his place of work are
not compensible . . . However, in applying this general rule to border-line
cases, the term "employment" has been
held to include "not only the doing of
the work, but a reasonable margin of
time and space necessary to be used in
passing to and from the place where work
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is to be done."
In further
clarification of the general rule,
it has been held that injuries sustained by an employee while going to
or from his place of work upon premises owned or controlled by his employer are generally deemed to have
arisen out of and in the course of
employment . . . . Also, it is well
settled that if the employment creates
a special risk, an employee is entitled to compensation for injuries
sustained within that field of risk.
The employee may be subject to such
risk as soon as he enters the employer's premises or the necessary
means of access thereto, even when
the latter is not under employer's
control or management.
228 Cal.2d at 335-36, 170 P.2d at 22-23.
Similarly, in Freire v. Matson Navigation
Company, 21 Cal.2d 751, 118 P.2d 809 (1941), the
California Supreme Court affirmed compensation for
a janitor who worked upon a steam ship.

He reported

to work where the ship was moored every day at 8:00.
One morning, he took a taxi to work and as he was
getting out of the taxi he was struck by an automobile driven by one of the employees and owned by
the employer.

The court held that the accident

occurred within the scope of employment.
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It made no

riif ference to the court that the accident occurred

on a public road since the danger was one to which
the employee, by reason of and in connection with

his employment, was subjected peculiarly or to an
abnormal degree.
Other courts have likewise extended the
rule, have adopted the Utah rule and have expanded
it to include dangers which are peculiar to public
highways.

In Montgomery v. State Industrial Acci-

dent Commission, 224 Ore. 380, 356 P.2d 524 (1960),
the employee was granted recovery resulting from
an accident when he was struck by an automobile as
he undertook to cross the thorough-fare in front of
the employer's premises.

The court adopted the

Utah rule expressed in the Cudahy case and in the
Bountiful Brick case and stated:
The essential facts in the
Parramore case are not materially
different from those of the case
at bar. In the Parramore case
/Cudahy Packing Co. v. Parramore,
263 U.S. 418, 44 S.Ct. 153 (1923),
aff'g, Cudahy Packing Co. v. InCuuuu..:.bt>.ion, OG u. .
lGl,
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207 P. 148 (1922)/, as in this
one the accident occurred upon
a public thorough-fare in front
of the plant where the men worked.
It is true that in the Parramore
case the source of danger was the
trains which operated across the
road which the workmen were required
to travel upon in going to and from
the place of their employment. In
the case at bar the source of danger was the vehicles which ran up
and down the street the plaintiff
was required to cross. The trains
in the Parramore case ran upon a
fixed rail, but motor vehicles in
their movement are not restrained
by rails. We do not believe that
it would be reasonable to rule that,
although a railroad train is a source
of hazard to those who must cross
its tracks, a motor truck, although
it not infrequently runs in a squadron-like formation with other vehicles, is not a source of hazard.
356 P.2d at 530.
For other cases allowing recovery for injuries received entering or leaving the premises of
the employer see Barnett v. Brittling Cafeteria
Company, 225 Ala. 462, 143 So. 813 (1932); State
Compensation Insurance Fund v. Industrial Accident
Commission, 192 Cal. 28, 227 P. 168 (1924); Chandler
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General Accident Fire and Life Insurance Corpor

-Jtion,

10 Ga. App. 597, 114 S.E.2d 438 (1960)·

,

DeHovos v. Industrial Commission, 26 Ill.2d 110,

185 N.E.2d 885 (1962); Mcfield v. Lincoln Hotel, 35
111. App.2d 340, 182 N.E.2d 905 (1962); Nelson v.
City of St. Paul, 249 Minn. 53, 81 N.W.2d 272 (1957);

Nevada Industrial Commission v. Leonard, SO Nev. 16,
68 P.2d 576 (1937).

Cf.

Seabreeze Industries, Inc.

v. Phily, 118 So.2d 54 (Dis.Ct.App.Fla. 1960).
C.

Plaintiff's Injury was Causally
Related to his Employment.
In the instant case, there exists a sufficient

causal relation between plaintiff's employment and
his presence at the entranceway of his employer's
premises to bring into play the "hazardous entranceway" line of cases mentioned above, even though
plaintiff was not actually leaving the premises
directly after he had completed his driving duties.
While it is true that the "hazardous entranceway"
line of cases involved employees coming to and

24

employees have definite hours, are not expected to
report periodically, and generally use the entrance
to their employer's premises only when they are
going to or leaving work.

The peculiar fact situa-

tion surrounding the terms of employment in this
case has not been presented to this Court before

'
but the record in this case substantiates the fact
that plaintiff's presence at the employer's entranceway was encouraged and in fact, contemplated in his
employment duties.
First, it is established that the drivers
at Garrett Freightlines who are on the extra board
are subject to a twenty-four-hour call.
12-13, 46, 51;
Exhibit 3.

Record at

7 of defendant's

Second, the record indicates that if

a driver on the extra board is not available when
he receives an alert call from Garrett's, he is
dropped to the bottom of the extra board list,
foregoes employment until his name again reaches
the top of the list, and is subject to disciplinary
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action from the company.
80, 113-14.

Record at 16-17, 55, 79-

Third, both Mr. Stoddard, a driver

for defendant who has served on the extra board,
and the plaintiff testified that in order to avoid
the consequences of not being available when Garrett Freightlines called, they periodically kept
in touch with Garrett Freightlines to determine
their probable departure time.
16-17, 52-53.

Record at 12-13,

Fourth, according to the witnesses

for the plaintiff and for Garrett, it was standard
procedure at Garrett Freightlines to expect these
periodic reports or calls from the men on the
extra board in order that they could determine their
probable departure time and thereby make themselves
available for call.
53.

Record at 12-13, 17, 43, 52-

Although it was usual procedure for the drivers

on the extra board to telephone Garrett's to determine their status on the board, Record at 120, both
the plaintiff's witnesses and witnesses for Garrett
testified that Garrett had no objection to the dri7ers coming in personally to find out that information;
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this practice was never discouraged.
15, 52-53, 54, 110, 113-14, 120.

Record at

In fact, Mr.

Christensen, manager of Garrett's terminal, indicated that during the week of the hearing, drivers
had reported in personally to check on their position on the board.

Record at 112.

Fifth, the dri-

vers at Garrett could expect a call to work at anytime, including when they called in to make themselves available.

Record at 19, 55-56, 76-77.

Sixth, Garrett discouraged telephone calls by the
extra board drivers between the hours of 4:00 p.m.
and 6:00 p.m.

Record at 18.

Therefore, if drivers

were in the vicinity of Garrett's during those hours,
they would appear in person in order to comply with
Garrett's policy of not calling in during those
hours, and yet still making themselves available for
work.

This would be true especially if, like plain-

tiff, a driver was living alone and would be away
from his telephone during the normal calling hours.
See record at 52-54.

Seventh, although the extra
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board sheet indicated that plaintiff would report
in at 5:30 p.m., it was contrary to the labor contract between Garrett and the Teamster's Union to
retain a man's position on the extra board if an
assignment to drive came up before any indicated
time of reporting.

Record at 110-12.

Also, plain-

tiff had been passed over once before by Garrett
and had been dropped to the bottom of the extra
board rotation list because he could not be reached
for an assignment which came up before his indicated
check-in time.

Record at 55.

Therefore, plaintiff

was justified from his past experience with Garrett
and because of the Union contract to report prior
to the 5:30 p.m. hour.
Consequently, plaintiff's presence at Garrett's
entranceway at the time of his accident was sufficiently employment related to bring him within the
exception to the "going and coming" rule.

An acci-

dent arises in the course of employment "if it occurs while the employee is rendering service to his
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employer which he was hired to do or doing something incidental thereto, at the time when and
the place where he was authorized to render such
service."

M & K Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 112

Utah 488, 493, 189 P.2d 132 (1948).

An employee

can recover under workmen's compensation if he is
engaged in some employment-related activity.

The

Utah court has stated:
On the other hand, in order for
an employee to be covered by workmen's
compensation, it is not necessary that
he be doing the particular task which
constitutes his main duties, but there
are many employment-related activities
which employees are expected to participate in and in which they are covered.
The essential thing is that there be some
substantial rel&tionship between the
activity engaged in and the carrying on
of the employer's business.
Askren v. Industrial Com..m'n, 15 Utah 2d 275, 277,
391 P.2d 302, 304 (1964).
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing authorities and argument, plaintiff respectfully submits the Order of
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the Industrial Corrunission of Utah dated May 22,
1969, is contrary to law and that said Commission
should be ordered and directed by this Court to
award plaintiff compensation as provided for by
the Industrial Act of the State of Utah.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL
& McCARTHY
Roger H. Thompson

141 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah

84111

Attorneys for Plaintiff
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